This paper is an attempt to reflect on our relative proximity and remoteness to Nazi perpetrators of evil by examining what Bernard Williams has called the problem of “moral luck.” Such situational factors as genetics, class, race/ethnicity, religion, political upheavals and special nurturing relationships provide us with what John Rawls has called the “starting points” of our lives as emergent adults and moral agents. For skeptics like Williams, though, it is unclear that either “saint” or “sinner” has the requisite moral (...) responsibility we take them ordinarily to have, given such situational luck. This paper responds to such skepticism by sketching a version of “compatibilism” that helps itself to insights from recent virtue theory in ethics and functionalism in cognitive science. A major part of this response is a discussion of Chapter 6 of David H. Jones’ important study, Moral Responsibility in the Holocaust, where he argues that Hitler was to blame for the evil he perpetrated because he was responsible for becoming the person he was through an active project of self-deception. Of particular concern here will be how we can use a functionalist account of mind, virtue/vice and compatibilism to understand the phenomenon of a moral agent engaged in an active project of self-deception. At stake here is, of course, our own proximity to such agency. (shrink)

Debate concerning virtual reality is often drawn in terms of sharply defined dichotomies--for example, between "real" (or "actual") and "virtual," "authentic" and "inauthentic," and "natural" and "artificial." In this paper we offer an alternative approach by suggesting a conception of a virtual world that highlights a continuity and commonality with our sense of everyday reality. We accomplish this in part by an examination of the English picturesque garden as if it were a virtual world partially constructed out of ideas and (...) objects collected during travels to foreign lands on the Grand Tour. Such foreign travel transformed not only the English person's sense of self, but also altered the English landscape. We conclude that in one sense the "real" England is also a "virtual" reality. (shrink)

A central and integral feature of Mill's version of Utilitarianism is the necessity for moral agents to empathize with others, for without such empathy one has little or no motivation to pursue the general good. Mill believed that Benthamite Utilitarianism failed to provide a sufficient mechanism to induce would-be moral agents to empathize with others. Mill located the requisite mechanism when reading English Romantic poetry and theory: in particular, Mill believed that to empathize completely with others requires a special kind (...) of imagination. I argue that the theory of imagination adopted by Mill was essentially Wordsworthian. The importance of this conception of imagination has far reaching effects in Mill's thought: for example, Mill's infamous proof of the principle of utility is plausible only when considered in the context of the Mill's Romantic theory of imagination. ;Mill's initiation into aesthetics occurred in the late 1820s and early 1830s when Mill was also first exposed to Continental, and particularly to French, sociologists, especially to Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte. I investigate the nature and extent of their influence on Mill. Interestingly, there are some important parallels between this group and the English Romantics. Though widely divergent in political theory, all were, in some sense, conservatives and elitists. Both Comte and Coleridge, for example, thought that society ought to be run by a clerisy constituted primarily by the intellectual elite of society. This posed a serious problem for Mill both as an empiricist and as a liberal. Indeed, some have argued that, at least for some periods of his life, Mill abandoned both his empiricist heritage and his liberalism. I examine these issues in detail arguing that, in typical fashion for Mill, he attempted an amalgam of these various doctrines. In the final analysis, however, Mill remained firmly committed both to empiricism--and the reductionist and mechanistic view it implied--as well as to liberalism, though it is a liberalism with definite elitist strains within it. (shrink)

This book discusses five philosophers and writers, Hume, Kierkegaar, Camus, Simone Weil and Dostoevsky, who represents different strands of our cultural inheritance which are all theologically and religiously alive today. What they have in common is willingness to explore the borderlands between belief and unbelief and to review their own position in the light of what those coming from the opposite direction may have to teach them. What they each reject is the sort of caricature which assumes that belief an (...) unbelief and to review their own position in the light of what those coming from the opposite direction may have to teach them. What they each reject is the sort of caricature which assumes that belief and unbelief are two homogeneous wholes which have nothing to say to each other and no ground for common discussion other that that of agnosticism. Equally, however, they disdain the implications that the only possibility of dialogue is a marshmallow middle ground where the only rule is that you avoid saying what you really think. Theologians and believers have often stood back from exploration on this middle ground. Encounters with secular philosophies or systems of belief are risky and dangerous. On the other hand, a theology which avoids such encounters is a much impoverished theology. Professor Sutherland's discussion considers the nature and extent of the risk, and the title of his book indicates where the believers who live close to the boundaries often share more with neighbourly unbelievers than they do with fellow believers who view the pastures of unbelief as far distant and dangerou lands from which they will for ever remain separated. (shrink)

Several defences, viewed in this study as specifications or 'offspring' of the 'parent' greater-good defence, have been formulated in response to the charge that Christianity is untenable because God's existence is incompatible with evil's existence. In this first book-length study of the parent defence, Stewart begins with careful definitions of the omni-attributes central to the dispute: omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence. The parent defence is traced to tenets of theism and variant accounts of the defence considered. Plantinga's modal free-will defence and (...) Hick's and Yandell's soul-growth specifications are carefully analyzed and several difficulties resolved. An original formulation of a redemption specification and an original account of the origin of moral evil are offered. Stewart argues that the defences are rightly viewed as a family of defences falling under the greater-good heading, and that they comprise a complementary apologetic complex that refutes the claim of inconsistency. (shrink)

The title of this book, __Leibniz's Mill__, is taken from Leibniz's famous metaphor in support of a dualism between the mind, or self, and the body. Given that Descartes constructed the most famous defense of mind/body dualism, the first chapter is a basic exposition and defense of Descartes' arguments, as well as Leibniz's supporting argument. Charles Landesman's basic claim, argued with clarity and philosophical precision, is that dualism is to be preferred to materialism; namely, the self is not reducible to (...) the body, mental processes are not reducible to brain processes, and the idea that the self is a mental substance constitutes the best understanding of all the facts of mental life. Landesman takes up the central philosophical topics on the nature of the self and the mind in arguing that dualism is a defensible position, even if our mental life is dependent in some respects on the body. Dependency is not the same as identity. Nor should one deny that many bodily events are dependent upon states of mind. He examines our knowledge of other minds, the mind's knowledge of itself, and Descartes' famous argument "I think, therefore I am"; efforts by philosophers such as Hume, Nietzsche, William James, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger to deny the reality of a substantial ego; the mind's way of knowing of the physical world, with its "great deception of sense"; and finally, the teleological structure of human action and the problem of free will. Landesman argues that the dualism of mind and body is perfectly compatible with modern science and that, contrary to the claims of many philosophers, there is no reason to hold that science presupposes a naturalistic or materialistic framework. "Charles Landesman shows that Cartesian mind-body dualism is alive and well and more plausible than its naturalistic and materialistic competitors. This is a first-rate piece of work that will be of real interest to philosophers and educated readers with interests in the philosophy of mind, history of philosophy, and epistemology. It should find a large readership among those who are looking for an alternative to the physicalist perspective that has long dominated the academy." --_Stewart Goetz, Ursinus College_ "Charles Landesman writes effortlessly, conveying to readers a rich alternative to today's mainline forms of materialism. This is a book that is comparable to Richard Rorty's _Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature_ or Roderick M. Chisholm's _Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study_. Like the former, it is historical and substantial, like the latter it is unapologetic in advancing with clear arguments an under-represented position." --_Charles Taliaferro, St. Olaf College _. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Précis of Microaggressions in MedicineLauren Freeman (bio) and Heather Stewart (bio)Microaggressions in Medicine demonstrates that the harms of microaggressions are anything but micro. Guided by diverse patient testimonies and case studies, the book focuses on harms experienced by patients who are marginalized on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, body size, and disability. It amplifies their voices, stories, and experiences, which have too often been excluded from (...) mainstream bioethical, medical, and popular discussions. The novel account advanced in Microaggressions in Medicine illustrates that microaggressions in medicine are not rare, but frequent in the healthcare experiences of marginalized patients. Our hope is that the book helps patients better understand and make sense of their experiences. We also hope that it helps current and future healthcare professionals recognize the serious and enduring consequences that microaggressions can have on their patients. Finally, it introduces actionable strategies for healthcare professionals to reduce microaggressions in their practices and institutions.Microaggressions in Medicine argues that healthcare professionals have a moral obligation to prevent microaggressions as much as possible. It aims to make a positive difference in the lives of marginalized patients as they interact with medical practitioners and institutions. It also aims to support healthcare professionals in modifying their practices to ensure that they are always providing high-quality, patient-centered care to all patients. Its ultimate goal is to help increase health equity.More specifically, the book has two broad goals: one theoretical, one practical. The theoretical goal is to reconceptualize how microaggressions have been understood in the literature and to develop this new account within medical contexts. The practical goal is to provide healthcare professionals with a greater understanding of the serious and enduring consequences that microaggressions can have on members of marginalized patient groups and to introduce strategies and tools to help healthcare professionals reduce microaggressions experienced [End Page 142] by patients, thereby diminishing harm caused to patients. To set the context for the critical responses to follow, we briefly summarize each chapter of the book, highlighting the main arguments and novel contributions.Microaggressions can be defined as actions, gestures, or even material environments that subtly and often unintentionally harm members of marginalized groups. They are prevalent in medicine yet often go unnoticed by those who commit them. The introduction outlines the main problem with which the book engages: that there are subtle things that healthcare professionals commonly say and do to patients that do not register as serious to them yet that often cause major harms to patients in the short and long term. To set the stage to unpack this problem, we define what microaggressions are, provide examples of microaggressions in medical contexts, outline the aims and goals of the book, and explain key concepts (e.g., intersectionality, harm, structural oppression) that are necessary for understanding and engaging with the book's arguments. The introduction makes clear how and why a discussion of microaggressions in medicine is valuable to marginalized patients who want to better understand their own experiences interacting with healthcare professionals and institutions. It also underscores the book's value for healthcare professionals who want to improve their clinical interactions with marginalized patients and strategize about how to make their practices more inclusive, welcoming, and just.Chapter 1, "Microaggressions: A Brief History," provides a history of microaggressions. The term was coined in 1970 by a Black Harvard psychologist, Chester Pierce, to describe the "subtle blows" experienced by Black people that are not major or explicit yet that cause real harm. Although little was written about microaggressions for almost four decades, microaggressions gained traction in 2007 through the work of psychologist Derald Sue and his colleagues. We discuss Sue et al.'s work on microaggressions, tracing key revisions and developments the concept has undergone in the last fifteen years. The chapter also summarizes some of the main criticisms that have been launched against microaggressions and considers responses that have been offered. This chapter provides the groundwork for chapter 2, which lays out our novel critique of the dominant understanding of microaggressions. It also motivates our reconceptualization of microaggressions that unfolds over the remainder of the book.Chapter 2, "Microaggressions Reconsidered: A Critique of the Act-Based... (shrink)

Universal human rights and particular cultural identities, which are relativistic by nature, seem to stand in conflict with each other. It is commonly suggested that the relativistic natures of cultural identities undermine universal human rights and that human rights might compromise particular cultural identities in a globalised world. This article examines this supposed clash and suggests that it is possible to frame a human rights approach in such a way that it becomes the starting point and constraining framework for all (...) non-deficient cultural identities. In other words, it is possible to depict human rights in a culturally sensitive way so that universal human rights can meet the demands of a moderate version of meta-ethical relativism which acknowledges a small universal core of objectively true or false moral statements and avers that, beyond that small core, all other moral statements are neither objectively true nor false. (shrink)

From a 1996 survey comparing the views of economists and ordinary voters, Bryan Caplan deduces several biases—anti‐market, anti‐foreign, pessimistic, and makework biases—to support his thesis that voters are rationally irrational, i.e., that, aware of the inconsequentiality of their votes, they rationally indulge their “preferences” for public policies that have harmful results. Yet if the standard of comparison is the public’s opposition to harmful policies, rather than the level of its opposition relative to that of economists, the “biases” disappear. In absolute (...) terms, voters support free trade and are against protectionism, such that free‐trade agreements are more prevalent among democratic, rather than autocratic, regimes. Finally, the protectionist policies that are adopted in this country are the product of interest‐group politics, not of voters’ wrongheaded policy preferences. (shrink)

This book is a creative, original argument about the variety of forms of expression across the history of philosophy.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to CommentariesLauren Freeman (bio) and Heather Stewart (bio)We are grateful and humbled that this esteemed group of scholars and healthcare practitioners have dedicated the time to read and engage with our book. Their thoughtful, critical comments have given us new ways of reflecting on our own work, compelled us to develop and expand some of our claims, and have also nudged us to move in new directions (...) that we hope to explore in future research. In what follows, we reply to each of the commentaries, focusing on what we take to be the most central insights, critiques, and areas for further exploration from each contribution.Catherine Sherron (2024) offers an expansive commentary on chapter 4, "Epistemic Microaggressions," focusing on the nature of epistemic agency, situating epistemic agency within the bioethical context of the principle of autonomy, considering epistemic microaggressions and the phenomenon of silencing of patients, asking whose evidence counts when making claims within medical contexts, and questioning how we might develop a system of reward and admonishment to healthcare professionals who respectively mitigate and commit microaggressions. She presents far more content than we can adequately respond to here. We have chosen to focus on Sherron's specific point about why certain patients experience epistemic microaggressions and what they can do about it. Her line of reasoning echoes an argument found in popular articles about women's health and healthcare that, while seemingly reasonable at first glance, is fraught with problematic assumptions and implications that we would like to draw out and reflect on. Doing so helps pinpoint where the locus of our attention should be in our aim to diminish microaggressions in medical contexts, without placing that burden on the very people who experience and are harmed by them.Within the context of discussing possible contributing factors that perpetuate epistemic microaggressions for patients, Sherron mentions the reality that "patients often don't have good scientific or medical literacy, or education generally, so they might not be in a position to advocate for themselves as epistemic [End Page 169] agents" (150). We surmise that Sherron's more complete argument runs something like this. Many patients lack scientific or medical literacy, postsecondary and postgraduate education, and the language, concepts, and frameworks to be fully empowered epistemic agents and best communicate with healthcare professionals on their terms. As a consequence—and combined with other factors pertaining to their identities and the accompanying stereotypes and biases that healthcare professionals (and all of us) hold—patients who are members of marginalized groups are often not treated as epistemic equals or epistemic peers by healthcare professionals; they are also unable to best advocate for themselves or to speak up in the aftermath of experiencing microaggressions (or macroaggressions) in medical contexts. Thus, if patients were more literate, educated, and able to speak the language of healthcare professionals, they would be able to better advocate for themselves, and they would be better positioned to speak up and respond when epistemic microaggressions (and other injustices and harms) occur. As a result, their situation and relationships with healthcare professionals, their epistemic credibility, and consequently, their care (and maybe even their health outcomes) would improve. Thus, the line o argument implies that we ought to focus our attention on empowering patients: helping them learn how to better educate and advocate for themselves so that they can improve their epistemic situation and, consequently, receive better medical care.This line of argument is common in popular books and articles about women's health (see Dusenbery [2018], who criticizes the argument and Gainty [2023], Jacqueline [2024], Lichtman et al. [2015], Onque [2022], and Singh [2015] where the argument is promoted). The consensus seems to be that yes, there is a problem: women and members of marginalized groups are not getting adequate healthcare, and if only they took better control of and responsibility for their care, they could and would receive better care. We are highlighting this line of reasoning because it is commonplace, problematic, and dangerous.Such an argument is worrisome for at least two reasons. First, the suggested solution—that members of marginalized groups just need to become better advocates for themselves—is not only a form of (unintentional... (shrink)

SummaryAccording to Dummett's understanding of Frege, the sense of a denoting expression is a procedure for determining its denotation. The purpose of this article is to pursue this suggestion and develop a semi‐formal interpretation of Fregean sense for the special case of a first‐order language of arithmetic. In particular, we define the sense of each arithmetic expression to be a hypothetical process to determine the denoted number or truth value. The sense‐process is “hypothetical” in that the senses of some expressions (...) cannot be completed in a finite number of steps. The motivation for this work is to explicate an intensional notion of effectiveness in terms of the senses of function names. It is proposed, in particular, that an expression is effective if and only if its sense can be completed in a finite number of steps. It is shown that a function is computable if and only if it has an effective name.RésuméSelon la lecture que Dummet donne de Frege, le sens ?on;une expression consiste en une procédure pour déterminer sa dénotation. Le but de cet article est de développer cette suggestion par une interprétation semi‐formelle du sens frégéen dans le cas particulier ?on;un langage de premier ordre en arithmétique. En particulier, nous définissons comme sens de toute expression mathématique un procédé hypothétique pour déterminer le nombre dénoté ou la valeur de vérité. Le procédé créateur de sens est hypothetique en ce sens que les sens de certaines expressions ne peuvent pas être donnés en un nombre fini de pas. Le but de cette étude est ?on;expliciter une notion intensionnelle ?on;effectuabilite en termes de sens des noms de fonction. II est en particulier propose qu'une expression soit dite effectuable si et seulement si son sens peut être épuisé en un nombre fini de pas. On montre qu'une fonction est calculable si et seulement si elle a un nom effectuable.ZusammenfassungDummets Auffassung von Frege gemäss besteht der Sinn eines denotierenden Ausdruckes in einem Verfahren, das dessen Denotation bestimmt. Es ist der Zweck der vorliegenden Arbeit, die‐sen Vorschlag weiterzufuUhren und eine halbformale Interpretation des Fregeschen Sinnes fiir den besonderen Fall der Sprache erster Stufe der Arithmetik zu entwickeln. Es wird im besonderen der Sinn eines jeden arithmetischen Ausdruckes als hypothetisches Verfahren zur Bestimmung der denotierten Zahl oder des Wahrheitswertes definiert. Die Sinngebung ist insofern hypothe‐tisch, als der Sinn gewisser Ausdrucke nicht in einer endlichen Zahl von Schritten gegeben wer‐den kann. Das Anliegen der Arbeit grundet in der Absicht, einen intensionalen Begriff der Effek‐tivitat aufgrund des Sinnes von Funktionsnamen zu erlautern. Es wird im besonderen festgelegt, dass ein Ausdruck dann und nur dann effektiv sei, wenn sein Sinn in einer endlichen Zahl von Schritten erreicht werden kann. Es wird gezeigt, dass eine Funktion genau dann berechenbar ist, wenn sie einen effektiven Namen hat. (shrink)

Some central philosophical issues concern the use of mathematics in putatively non-mathematical endeavors. One such endeavor, of course, is philosophy, and the philosophy of mathematics is a key instance of that. The present article provides an idiosyncratic survey of the use of mathematical results to provide support or counter-support to various philosophical programs concerning the foundations of mathematics.

Søren Kierkegaard is an author who, due to his creative use of genre, has been difficult to characterize straightforwardly. His unconventional form of writing has at times been understood as a part of his criticism of German speculative philosophy; however, little work has been done to actually understand the nature of his criticism and his precise objection to the form of presentation traditionally used by systematic philosophy. In this article it is argued that there is a close connection between the (...) form and the content of speculative philosophy, and that due to his disagreements with the content of the latter Kier- kegaard was obliged to make use of a different literary form in order to criticize it. (shrink)